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rganizations have difﬁculty learning from rare and unusual events because of their inability to interpret these events.
Because organizations develop habitual ways of interpreting events—often top down—they can easily miss the novelty
of rare and unusual events, which prevents them from experiencing events “richly.” We propose a multilevel, multistaged
model of organizational interpretation that highlights the important, but generally unacknowledged, role middle managers
can play in helping organizations experience rare and unusual events richly. Our model accounts for the effect of cognitive
biases and hierarchical context on organizational interpretation. Because of their proximity to the interpretations of both
strategic and front-line managers, middle managers can encourage divergence in interpretations of managers across hierarchical levels during early stages of the interpretation process and can blend and synthesize the divergent interpretations of
managers during later stages. In this way middle managers contribute to a dynamic process of organizational interpretation
in which multiple ﬁlters from throughout the organization help frame and enrich interpretations of rare and unusual events,
which enables organizational learning.
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experience and interpretation of rare and unusual events
because they are the “hub through which most strategic information ﬂows” (Floyd and Lane 2000, p. 164).
Middle managers can facilitate divergence of interpretation in early stages of organizational interpretation by
surfacing conﬂicting views—and convergence in later
stages of interpretation by synthesizing disparate views.
Both divergence and convergence play an important part
in learning from rare and unusual events and in strategic choices (Park 2007). Divergent thinking early in
the recognition of a rare and unusual event encourages
multiple ways of interpreting and viewing the event.
Convergence, in contrast, enables action and adaptation.
Thus, organizations increase their capacity to learn from
rare and unusual events when they resist an exclusively
top-down approach to interpretation and instead solicit
the participation of middle managers during both the
early phases and subsequent process of interpretation
and analysis.
We develop our key arguments by drawing primarily from the literature on organizational interpretation,
with additional insights borrowed from research on rare
and unusual events and organizational learning. We
focus on three essential dimensions of organizational
interpretation—temporal, cognitive, and hierarchical. We
show that interpretation occurs in stages (Isabella 1990),
with each stage being inﬂuenced by cognitive biases and

If history repeats itself, and the unexpected always
happens, how incapable must Man be of learning from
experience. (George Bernard Shaw 1903)

Research suggests that organizational success depends
on learning to predict, detect, and deal with rare and
unusual events (Ansoff 1975, Cunha et al. 2006, Lampel
and Shapira 2001, Watkins and Bazerman 2003). However, studies show that behavioral and organizational
habits “make it difﬁcult to ‘see’ what is right in front of
one’s face” (Day and Schoemaker 2004, p. 137). Organizations have difﬁculty learning from rare and unusual
events because of their inability to interpret these events;
they rely on “habitual ways of thinking and perceiving”
(Senge et al. 2004, p. 29), missing the novelty of the
event. In this paper, we argue that effective learning from
rare and unusual events, although difﬁcult, can occur
if decision makers develop the ability to perceive and
experience events “richly.” This ability requires expanding the number and diversity of interpretations of rare
and unusual events as they happen (March et al. 1991).
Traditionally, organizational scholars have viewed the
interpretation process as primarily the responsibility of
top managers, leaving the rest of the organization to
implement appropriate actions. But in this paper we
argue that contrary to that view, middle managers play
a crucial and hitherto neglected role in enriching the
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hierarchical context. We then use examples from the
space shuttle Columbia disaster1 to show how the lack of
meaningful middle manager involvement at each stage
of the disaster interpretation may have impeded organizational learning. We use this counterpoint example to
explore middle management behaviors that enable organizations to experience rare and unusual events more
richly, thereby enhancing organizational learning. We
conclude with a discussion of the contributions, limitations, and implications of our model.

Dealing with Rare and Unusual Events
Rare and unusual events can originate both from within
(Isabella 1990) and from outside the organization (Barr
1998). Such events can take many forms: strategic surprises (Cunha et al. 2006, Lampel and Shapira 2001),
environmental jolts (Meyer 1982), and major change
events (Brown and Humphreys 2003). By deﬁnition,
rare and unusual events occur infrequently and thus
present unique learning challenges because of organizations’ lack of direct experience. Lack of direct experience forces people to search for ways to understand
such events by creating interpretations and narratives
that can reduce the associated ambiguity (Abma 2000,
Cunha et al. 2006). In the case of rare and unusual
events, the existing narratives typically fail to provide
interpretations that organizational members regard as
meaningful or satisfactory. This in turn leads individuals to search for new interpretations, not to mention
creating new stories, that better account for the origins and impact of the events. More generally, repeated
exposure to rare and unusual events often induces an
ongoing process of organizational sensemaking through
narratives and interpretation that is itself an important
skill (Czarniawska 1998).
Generally, organizational scholars have addressed rare
and unusual events in one of three ways. First, some
scholars have focused on the importance of trying to
detect, predict, and avoid such events (Ansoff 1975,
Kauffman 1995, Lampel and Shapira 2001, Watkins and
Bazerman 2003, Wissema 2002). Others have focused
on how managers deal with such events by socially constructing their environments, selectively perceiving some
cues and ignoring others, and then enacting what gets
labeled as a surprise or a crisis (Lant et al. 1992, Mezias
and Starbuck 2003, Nystrom and Starbuck 1984, Weick
1995). Finally, complexity scholars have begun to view
organizations as unpredictable complex social systems
(Kauffman 1995, Levy 1994) in which rare and unusual
events emerge from unexpected places (Balogun 2006,
Plowman et al. 2007). Novelty and surprise are pervasive and unavoidable features of these complex social
systems (Cunha et al. 2006, McDaniel et al. 2003),
and they often require unique organizational responses
(Majchrzak et al. 2007).
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In all cases, noticing and extracting salient cues represent the ﬁrst steps an organization must take to make
some sense of rare and unusual events. The cues that
get noticed and extracted are the ones that get enhanced
with meaning and interpretations (Weick 1995), which is
how the organization learns. How, then, do organizations
interpret and make sense of rare and unusual events to
learn from them? How do organizations avoid looking at
today’s events through tired perceptual lenses? Focusing
on top managers as the sole interpreters of such events
ignores the reality that organizations consist of many
managers, each of whom must create their own individual interpretation of each particular event. Each interpretation likely helps shape the interpretations of others up,
down, and across the hierarchy and contributes to what
the organization learns.
Our central argument is that the interpretation of rare
and unusual events occurs at all levels of the organization and that at each level cognitive heuristics affect
interpretations and contribute to conﬂicting understandings. Our model suggests that when middle managers
actively participate during all stages of the interpretation process, organizations are less likely to make mistakes and more likely to use richer interpretations, which
enhance their learning from rare and unusual events.

Issues with Organizational Learning
Three basic ideas from the organizational learning literature inform the discussion about interpretation and
learning from rare and unusual events: (1) organizations
learn in stages, (2) organizations learn from experience
(Huber 1991, Senge 1990), and (3) organizations learn
from small samples by experiencing history richly. Each
of these ideas has unique importance when the event
facing the organization is rare and unusual.
Organizations Learn in Stages
The stages of scanning, interpretation, action, and learning/readjustment characterize most models of learning
(e.g., Daft and Weick 1984, Day and Schoemaker 2004).
In the scanning stage, organizations collect data; in
the interpretation stage, they give meaning to data.
In the action stage of learning, organizations decide and
respond; and in the learning/readjustment stage, they
obtain feedback and readjust. Thus, our attention to how
organizations interpret unusual events (the second stage
of learning) informs the conversation about how organizations learn from those events.
Organizations Learn from Direct Experience
Perhaps the most profound learning for either individuals or organizations comes from direct experience. For
example, a person or organization takes an action, and
on seeing the consequence of the action takes a different
action.
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However, learning from experience is difﬁcult for
organizations for several reasons. First, individuals are
imperfect processors of information (Hogarth 1987) and
“as sensors of experience, function imperfectly” (Huber
1991, p. 95). Second, people often have competing interpretations of what past experiences mean (Levitt and
March 1988). Finally, organizational members may not
be able to assess the consequences of many of their decisions because these can sometimes take years to fully
unfold (Senge 1990). For example, the full implications
of a strategic decision to acquire a competitor are often
not fully known for years, long after the actual decision
makers may be gone. In the case of rare and unusual
events, experience as a teacher is even more limited,
because organizations most likely have not experienced
such an event before.
Organizations Learn from Small Samples
Rare and unusual events are by deﬁnition “small samples,” but as March and colleagues argue, organizations
can learn from small samples by “experiencing history
richly” (1991, p. 2). March and colleagues suggest this
happens in three ways. First, organizations can learn
more effectively when they are able to experience more
aspects of the event as they are responding to it, even as
the event is occurring. The organization is able to do this
when its members actively engage in asking questions.
What does this event mean today? What will it mean
tomorrow? What does the organization’s response mean?
How does the organization’s response change what we
believe? If organizations encourage this kind of ongoing sensemaking as the event and the organization’s
response unfold rather than after the fact, the organization “learns as it goes.” Learning then occurs from
experiencing the event, rather than merely from the consequences following the event.
A second way organizations experience rare and
unusual events richly, according to March and colleagues (1991), is to experience more interpretations
from more and different people. Individuals may learn
different lessons when confronted with the same incident. Other learning scholars have also argued that
learning is enhanced when there is a focus on multilevel information sources (Schwab 2007), when there
are more interpretations (e.g., Huber 1991, March et al.
1991), and when there is diversity in interpretations
(Fiol 1994, Rothman and Friedman 2001). For example, Huber (1991, p. 102) states that “more learning
has occurred when more and more varied interpretations have been developed, because such development
changes the range of the organization’s potential behaviors.” When organizations seek out multiple interpretations of unusual events from multiple organizational
members, the chances of creating a “mosaic of conﬂicting lessons” (March et al. 1991, p. 3) increases.

The third way organizations experience rare and
unusual events richly is by experiencing different preferences for the outcomes of an event (March et al. 1991).
Yet as March and his colleagues point out, the impact of
an event’s outcomes is not self-evident. People differ in
their assessments of outcomes and in their preferences
for one outcome over another. When the differences in
how organizational members assess events and their outcomes are visible, “organizations learn what they are”
(March et al. 1991, p. 3). How an organization assesses
the impact of rare and unusual events depends in part
on what the ﬁrm values, its aspirations, and its identity.
Thus, organizations learn from rare and unusual events
when they experience and consider a broad set of aspirations or preferences for outcomes.
The discussion of March and colleagues (1991) of
learning from small samples by experiencing events
richly theoretically grounds the model of interpretation
developed in this paper. Organizations learn from rare
and unusual events when multiple players experience the
event as it unfolds, when multiple interpretations of the
event receive attention, and when the preferences for
assessing the event’s outcomes come from multiple players. In sum, a key to learning from rare and unusual
events is to experience them richly by encouraging multiple voices, perspectives, and interpretations.

Issues with Organizational Interpretation
Rare and unusual events require rich interpretation, yet
the interpretation literature has been somewhat narrowly
focused on how top managers inﬂuence how others
understand issues (Dutton and Jackson 1987, Gioia and
Thomas 1996, Maitlis 2005) and to what degree top
managers’ interpretations inﬂuence organizational outcomes (Thomas et al. 1993, Thomas and McDaniel
1990). Interpretation is the process of assigning meaning
to events, and two decades worth of research asserts that
organizations function as interpretation systems (Daft
and Weick 1984). Managers make sense of their environments by interpreting events (Weick 1993, 1995),
and this sensemaking forms the basis for organizational actions, adaptation, and performance (Barr 1998,
Thomas et al. 1993). Organizational interpretation is the
collective result of what is essentially an individual’s
experience. Organizational interpretation is a shared unit
property (Klein and Kozlowski 2000). It originates in the
individual unit members’ interpretations, yet converges
among organizational members because of unit members’ daily interactions.
The interpretation literature suggests at least two
notions about organizational interpretation that are relevant to rare and unusual events. First, most studies
of organizational interpretation take an “upper echelon”
view, drawing primarily on CEO accounts to represent
the organization’s view. This notion of organizational
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interpretation led scholars to identify variables that affect
top managers’ thinking, such as top-management-team
experiences, backgrounds, and information processing
capacity (Golden et al. 2000, Milliken 1990, Thomas
et al. 1993, Thomas and McDaniel 1990, Thomas et al.
1994). Although many scholars acknowledge the existence of multiple interpretations within organizations
(Brooks 1997, Lant et al. 1992, Martins and Kambil
1999, Sharma 2000), the majority of research focuses on
multiple interpretations within the same strategic level.
Assigning responsibility for organizational interpretation
solely to top management means that cues or signals
detected by lower-level managers can be disregarded by
those at higher levels, limiting what the organization
learns from unfolding events. In the case of rare and
unusual events, relying solely on top management interpretations limits the likelihood that the organization will
experience events richly.
A second notion from the interpretation literature is
that interpretation is considered a process that occurs
in stages (Daft and Weick 1984, Meyer 1982, Milliken
1990, Thomas et al. 1993), regardless of the event
encountered. What we know, empirically, about the process of interpretation has come largely from the studies
of Isabella (1990) and Barr (1998), who both observed
that interpretation of top managers evolves in distinct
stages. If, in fact, interpretation occurs in unique stages,
then what comes to be known as “unusual” or “rare”
evolves over time.
Although the interpretation literature advanced our
knowledge of organization-level interpretation and the
social construction of meaning, there has been little consideration of the role of middle managers in forming an
organization’s interpretation and scant attention to their
role in how the organization interprets and learns from
rare and unusual events. Middle managers are individuals who make decisions about how to implement the
organization’s strategic objectives. They operate at the
intermediate level of the organizational hierarchy, two
or three levels below the CEO (Dutton and Ashford
1993, Wooldridge and Floyd 1990); they supervise
supervisors and are supervised by others (Dutton and
Ashford 1993). Middle managers interpret information
and knowledge from top managers to make it meaningful
to those below them in the hierarchy who are responsible
for technical activities. At the same time they interpret
information and knowledge from functional managers
about technical and day-to-day realities of the organization (Dutton and Ashford 1993). They then select those
pieces of information that need top management attention. Thus, middle managers are responsible for interactions with those above them, with those they supervise,
and with their peers. As Floyd and Lane note, “The complexity of information and number of potential interactions, therefore, are greater for middle managers than for
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top or operating-level managers” (Floyd and Lane 2000,
pp. 164–165).
Middle managers’ pivotal position in the hierarchy
allows them to play a critical role in interpreting events,
creating meaning, and directing the attention of the organization (Dutton et al. 1997, Huy 2002, Sims 2003,
Van Cauwenbergh and Cool 1982). Nonaka (1988, 1994)
notes the importance of middle managers in creating
knowledge because they are at the intersection of the vertical and horizontal ﬂows of information. This is where
the tacit knowledge (personal, difﬁcult to formalize) of
the strategic levels becomes explicit knowledge (codiﬁed
and transmittable) for the front-line levels and where the
tacit knowledge of front-line managers becomes explicit
for strategic managers. Similarly, Balogun and Johnson
(2004) observed that middle managers help resolve cognitive disorder and therefore play a signiﬁcant role in the
sensemaking process.
Moreover, middle managers use their own tacit knowledge to help those above and beneath them “make sense”
of events (Rouleau 2005). Middle managers can help
organizations experience rare and unusual events richly
because they likely see more and different aspects of a
rare and unusual event than either top-level or front -line
managers. By virtue of their position in the organization
and their ongoing interactions, middle managers have
access to multiple and sometimes conﬂicting interpretations of others throughout the organization. We now turn
to this process of interpretation.

Temporal, Cognitive, and Hierarchical
Dimensions of Interpretation
Organizations form interpretations of rare and unusual
events to reduce ambiguity and also to learn how to deal
with such events in the future. However, organizational
members do not create interpretations of these events
all at once; interpretations usually form in stages (Barr
1998, Isabella 1990). Further, individuals are not perfect
information processors (Hogarth 1987, Simon 1947). At
each stage of the process, cognitive heuristics affect
interpretations (Hodgkinson and Sparrow 2002, Hogarth
1987, Schwenk 1984). Finally, organizational members
at all levels of the organization form their own interpretations of such events. These individual interpretations
are heavily inﬂuenced by the position of each individual
within the organizational hierarchy.
Temporal Sequence and Interpretation
of Rare Events
Isabella (1990) observed a temporal dimension to interpretation, that is, it occurs in four distinct stages (see
Table 1): anticipation, conﬁrmation, culmination, and
aftermath. The Anticipation Stage is comprised of the
rumors, speculations, and fragments of disjointed bits
of information regarding the event under consideration.
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Table 1

Multilevel Multistaged Model of Organizational Interpretation for Rare and Unusual Events

Stages of interpretation

Anticipation:
Conﬁrmation:
Interpretation of rare
Interpretation of rare
event is composed
event is an explanation
of rumors and tidbits
of what will happen
of information or
based on what has
speculation that an
happened before, also
event may happen.
what the event will
mean personally.

Culmination: Interpretation Aftermath: Interpretation
of rare event is an
of rare event is an
amended explanation
evaluation now that the
based on the event in
event has occurred,
progress, including
including strengths and
images of before and
weaknesses, winners
after.
and losers.

Cognitive biases likely to
affect each stage

—Selective perception
—Frequency
—Illusory correlation

—Framing
—Illusion of control
—Wishful thinking

Strategic managers’
interpretation

Assemble rumors of
Develop explanations of
possible rare event
rare event based on
that are consistent
previous strategic
with strategic
experiences.
assumptions and
beliefs.
Assemble rumors of
Develop explanations of
rare event that are
rare event based on
consistent with
previous operational
operational/technical
experiences.
assumptions and
beliefs.

Front-line managers’
interpretations

Middle managers’ role
Balance activity to
disseminate and
synthesize
interpretations of
strategic and
front-line managers
with that of other
middle managers.

Surface conﬂicting
rumors, and elicit
exposure of
information tidbits
from multiple
sources.

—Availability bias
—Representativeness
—Anchoring and
adjusting

Amend earlier explanation Develop strategic
of rare event, reducing
evaluations and
gap between strategic
assessments of
expectations and
strategic winners and
strategic realities.
losers from rare event.
Amend earlier explanation Develop operational
of rare event, reducing
evaluations and
gap between
assessments of
operational
operational winners
expectations and
and losers from rare
operational realities.
event.

Facilitate the exchange
Blend amended
of explanations of rare
explanations of rare
event that come from
event received from
numerous sources.
others in the
organization.

Conﬁrmation is the stage where comparisons are made
to similar and/or different past events and provide parallel frames of reference. Once additional information
is available, interpretations adjust to match the reality
of the event and thus reside in the Culmination Stage.
Finally, in the last stage of interpretation—Aftermath—
people evaluate the transpired event in terms of organizational effects and consequences.
Though Isabella’s model has been criticized for
being appropriate only for planned events (Barr 1998),
we must note that (1) planned events can be rare
and unusual, such as the decision to merge with
another ﬁrm or to launch a major new product, and
(2) for unplanned events, where the anticipation stage
is bypassed, Isabella’s model still explains behavior for
the conﬁrmation, culmination, and aftermath stages of
interpretation. Both Isabella’s (1990) and Barr’s (1998)
delineation of the temporal dimension of interpretation
lends support to Weick’s notion that “human situations
are progressively clariﬁed” (1995, p. 11). Thus, we chose
to incorporate Isabella’s (1990) four speciﬁc stages of
interpretation within our model, as those terms sufﬁciently capture the temporal similarities across existing
process models of interpretation and apply equally as
well to rare and unusual events.

—Hindsight bias
—Fallacies in recall
—Attribution bias

Synthesize the strategic
evaluations with
operational
evaluations of rare
event.

Cognitive Biases and Interpretation of Rare Events
Organizational interpretation processes are subject to
cognitive biases because individuals have limited information processing capacity (March and Simon 1958,
Simon 1947) and are selective rather than comprehensive in how they perceive information (Hogarth 1987).
People use cognitive heuristics to gain efﬁciencies
when processing information; however, these heuristics
often lead to biases (Bazerman 2006, Hogarth 1987).
Given the uncertainty that accompanies rare and unusual
events, people are likely to rely on convenient heuristics
to reduce uncertainty and enable quick action (Hogarth
1987). Thus, because of limited information processing
abilities, individuals see what they expect to see and
focus on information that is consistent with prior held
beliefs or experiences (Fiske and Taylor 1991, Hogarth
1987). Cognitive biases occur throughout the various
stages of information processing with some biases more
likely at early stages than at late ones (Hogarth 1987).
For example, early in interpretation stages as people are
acquiring information and making comparisons, heuristics such as selective perception and anchor and adjustment are likely to be a factor. Later, however, biases
such as representativeness, framing, and hindsight bias
are likely to be inﬂuential.2
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Hierarchical Context and Interpretation
of Rare Events
Organizational interpretation processes are also subject to local rationality (Cyert and March 1963) and
situated attention (Hoffman and Ocasio 2001, Ocasio
1997). First, organizations, as open systems, are a
set of nested subsystems (Ashmos and Huber 1987)
or “multi-hierarchical systems” (Van Cauwenbergh and
Cool 1982). Each subsystem or level in the system has
a local rationality (Cyert and March 1963) and develops
its own language and norms that inﬂuence what people in the subsystem perceive (Ocasio 2005). For example, top management is the “institutional” subsystem
that sets general direction and guides the organization
through the environment, and front-line management is
the “technical” subsystem that processes materials and
provides services to customers (Van Cauwenbergh and
Cool 1982). Middle managers form the implementation subsystem and provide linkage between the other
two levels (Wooldridge and Floyd 1990). The local
rationality created by each subsystem inﬂuences how
interpretations happen. The organization or the parts
of the environment that managers confront situate their
attention (Ireland et al. 1987) or distribute it according to function, channels of communication, or procedures (Ocasio 1997). The hierarchical context affects the
cues that managers notice (Weick 1995). This context
also contributes to competing interpretations between
and across hierarchical levels (Milliken et al. 2005).

Stages of Interpretation
Anticipation Stage—When Rumors Start to Fly
In the ﬁrst stage of interpretation—Anticipation—managers sense that something is about to happen, and the
interpretive task involves assembling disparate pieces of
information into an “in progress” frame of reference,
which will shape the understanding of events as they are
unfolding (Isabella 1990). The interpretation of the rare
event at this stage is vague (Barr 1998); it is in progress
because the frame develops as individuals acquire each
additional rumor or piece of speculative information.
Selective perception is likely to be a major cognitive factor affecting interpretations at the Anticipation Stage, as
people often look for rumors and tidbits of information
that are consistent with prior held beliefs and that reinforce existing views.3 At this stage, middle managers
receive rumors and tidbits of information from superiors and upper management that are inﬂuenced by the
strategic context and information from further down the
organization that is inﬂuenced by the context of technical
or marketplace realities. Because of their location in the
organization, they also hear rumors from other middle
managers that affect how they consider rare and unusual
events in this early stage (Balogun and Johnson 2004).

Organization Science 20(5), pp. 909–924, © 2009 INFORMS

Anticipation Stage and Rare Events. Standard ways
of scanning and observing—at all levels of the organization—are likely to be oriented toward known rather
than unknown events. Analysis of the space shuttle
Columbia disaster suggests that early warning signals
went unheeded, in part because managers at the Johnson Space Center discounted discordant information
(concerns from engineers that the foam debris was
dangerous). Rather than surfacing the discordant information, managers looked for conﬁrmatory data (there
have been many launches in which foam debris did not
cause a problem), thereby accumulating bits and pieces
of information that conﬁrmed their beliefs (Edmondson
et al. 2005). In addition, NASA managers discounted
any safety risks resulting from the foam strike and eventually came to view this type of damage as inevitable.
This discounting of risk was compounded by the fragmented, silo-style analysis used to assess the damage to
Columbia. Conﬂicting viewpoints and dissenting opinions thus remained at the local level and were “ineffective in overcoming conventional wisdom about foam
strikes” (Edmondson et al. 2005, p. 225). At the Anticipation Stage of interpretation it is easy for managers
to notice those cues that reinforce their previously held
views of the world, meaning some rare events may be
viewed as salient by some managers but not by others.
At this stage the rumors and tidbits of information competing for managers’ attention may well be in conﬂict,
further complicating how the organization gives meaning
to rare events.
Organizations at this stage of interpreting rare and
unusual events may display the tendency to try to control
the rumors or spread of information, leading to univocal interpretation or what Maitlis (2005) calls restricted
sensemaking. When this happens, the desire for control often trumps the need for divergent views, limiting
the organization’s opportunity for richly experiencing
the event. If allowed to play their pivotal role, middle
managers can enrich the way the organization experiences the rare and unusual event by championing multiple views, by surfacing rather than silencing rumors, and
by exposing rather than consolidating various tidbits of
information. Being a champion is one of the behaviors
that Floyd and Lane (2000) suggest for middle managers
wanting to help bring about strategic renewal.
We suggest that championing divergence and surfacing conﬂicting views is a role that middle managers can
play to enhance learning when the organization faces a
rare and unusual event. Middle managers can help the
organization experience events richly by giving visibility
to the multiple interpretations to which they have access.
In this way, they “animate” the interpretation process
by intensely exchanging information and encouraging
ongoing conversations (Maitlis 2005). For expected or
routine events, encouraging such divergence or animation may be too costly for the organization. However, for
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rare and unusual events that bring confusion and ambiguity, bringing conﬂicting perceptions to the surface can
help the organization hear from a broad set of voices
and minimize the chance of acting precipitously. Thus,
we propose:
Proposition 1. Organizations experience rare and
unusual events more richly when, at the Anticipation
Stage of interpretation, middle managers surface conﬂicting rumors and elicit multiple tidbits of information.
Conﬁrmation Stage—What Can We Expect Now?
In the second stage—Conﬁrmation—an event begins to
be experienced and individuals face the interpretive task
of standardizing the experience by explaining it (Isabella
1990). They do this by comparing the unfolding event
to past events that provide parallel frames of reference,
which can be used to create “conventional” explanations. Because people in the organization have different
past experiences with which to compare the unfolding
events, explanations at this stage will differ. The availability bias is likely to inﬂuence interpretations at this
stage because people often confuse easy-to-recall past
experiences with accurate or relevant past experiences
(Bazerman 2006, Hogarth 1987).4
When a rare and unusual event begins to unfold, top
managers —because of the availability bias—will likely
compare the event to their most recent strategic experience while front line managers will likely compare
the event to their most recent technical and operational
experiences. At the Conﬁrmation Stage of interpretation, middle managers have access to strategic managers’ explanations of a rare and unusual event, the
more narrow explanations from front-line managers, and
the explanations of their peers. These multiple and varied explanations form a “mosaic of conﬂicting lessons”
(March et al. 1991), but only if they are exposed and
exchanged.
Conﬁrmation Stage and Rare Events. Interpreting
events at the Conﬁrmation Stage is complicated when
the events are rare and unusual because of the lack of
any relevant history; research also suggests that people
are often overconﬁdent in situations where they know
the least (Bazerman 2006). Thus, when facing rare and
unusual events there is a great likelihood that managers
will conﬁdently assume that their experiences with past
events will inform the new and unknown event. Milliken
and colleagues (2005) offer an example of this from their
analysis of the Columbia disaster. They report that on
the second day of the ﬂight, video imagery revealed that
a piece of foam may have broken off during take-off
and struck the wing, but there was no agreement among
managers and engineers as to whether that event was
signiﬁcant. Milliken and colleagues (2005) observed that
also on Day 2 of the ﬂight, a working group asked for
additional imagery of the likely impacted area of the
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spacecraft. Upper-level managers ignored or denied all
requests for these images, largely because they easily
recalled past experiences with foam strikes that did not
cause failure.
In the Conﬁrmation Stage of interpretation, the explanations that managers offer of rare and unusual events
are likely to come from personal experiences. Managers
use personal experiences as cognitive starting points for
explanations because people are comfortable with their
own past experiences. However, using past experience
as a referent limits managers’ abilities to see new events
as rare or unusual and in need of careful attention. The
lessons from the Columbia disaster suggest that people
near the middle of the organization recognized the need
for more information and developed alternate explanations of what might be unfolding. However, these middle
managers failed to gain the attention of critical decision
makers; those with more organizational power ignored
them.
At this stage, middle managers are often privy to
numerous explanations of the rare and unusual event
as it unfolds. These many explanations are avenues for
the organization to experience the pending event more
richly. Rather than consolidate or ignore these multiple
and likely conﬂicting explanations, middle managers can
help the organization learn by sharing these explanations
and encouraging discussion of them (Hoon 2007). In this
way, the organization is more likely to “experience more
aspects of experience” (March et al. 1991, p. 2); that
is, more aspects of the rare and unusual event. Maitlis
(2005) referred to such divergence as “fragmented sensemaking” in which leaders do not attempt to control
sensemaking. With fragmented sensemaking, multiple
views and explanations are allowed to exist, and organizational members across all levels are actively engaged
in an “animated” sensemaking process.
During the Conﬁrmation Stage, organizations are
more likely to experience events richly when multiple views and explanations of the unfolding event are
exposed and multiple members participate in the interpretation process. Middle managers can contribute to
this fragmented yet animated sensemaking by aggressively sharing the multiple and possibly conﬂicting
explanations with the strategic and front-line managers
with whom they interrelate. If organizations hope to
keep from missing signals of rare and unusual events
(i.e., learn from past events), it is important that middle managers aggressively share information—a middle
management role suggested by Floyd and Lane (2000)—
and encourage the exchange of possible explanations of
what might happen. Thus, we propose:
Proposition 2. Organizations experience rare and
unusual events more richly when, at the Conﬁrmation
Stage of interpretation, middle managers facilitate the
exchange of explanations about what is likely to happen.
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Culmination Stage—Now We Deal with It
In the third stage—Culmination—there is a sense of
before and after. People reconstruct what they knew to
be true prior to the event in light of the new event,
comparing the old to the new and the past to the
present (Isabella 1990). Reconstruction involves determining what behaviors, interactions, and norms from
the past are still relevant and which of those needs
amending. In this stage, the use of frames (i.e., mental
structures through which people view the world) (Russo
and Schoemaker 2002, Tversky and Kahneman 1981) is
likely to be a cognitive factor affecting interpretation and
leading to conﬂicting understandings. At the Culmination Stage of interpretation, each manager’s frame guides
how he or she reconstructs his or her world, retaining
some understandings and altering others.5 At the Culmination Stage, middle managers receive amended explanations from front-line managers, from strategic managers, and from their peers across the organization and
face the task of bridging the gap between conﬂicting
explanations of what has happened.
Culmination Stage and Rare Events. The task of interpretation during the Culmination Stage becomes more
difﬁcult in the case of rare and unusual events because
the past offers few referents for how to consider what
has happened to help revise one’s explanation. Cognitive heuristics such as framing place further constraints
on understanding by narrowing the ﬁeld of vision. As a
result, subsequent action and learning may be fragmented or delayed. In their review of the Columbia disaster, Dunbar and Garud (2005) observed that NASA
operated using two conﬂicting organizing frames—one
that emphasized knowledge use in support of exploration
and another that emphasized knowledge use in support
of task performance.
This dual mode of operating resulted in different perspectives (or frames) of events with different meanings
in different parts of the organization. Some groups from
the “exploration” mode classiﬁed the foam loss as an
“out-of-family” event, and others from the “task performance” mode categorized it as an accepted risk. Top
management (from the task performance mode) established a low-status team to investigate the meaning of
the falling foam but did not give them the authority to
acquire needed photos, which could have led to a better amended explanation that integrated multiple views.
The dominance of the production or “task performance”
mode made it difﬁcult to understand the signiﬁcance
of data that from an “exploration” mode had more
signiﬁcance.
The consequences of this distributed organizational
understanding were data indeterminacy (or the inability
to assess the signiﬁcance of available data) and difﬁculty
in deciding on, developing, and initiating a response.
Rather than seeking to integrate the explanations offered
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by the two major modes, top management imposed
its explanation on the organization. Dunbar and Garud
(2005, p. 216), whose ﬁndings underscore the importance of accurate interpretation at the Culmination Stage,
quote NASA’s Columbia Accident Investigation Board:
Because managers failed to avail themselves of the wide
range of expertise and opinion necessary to achieve the
best answer to the debris strike question—“Was this
a safety-of-ﬂight concern?”—some Space Shuttle program managers failed to fulﬁll their implicit contract
to do whatever is possible to ensure the safety of the
crew. In fact, their management techniques unknowingly
imposed barriers that kept at bay both engineering concerns and dissenting views, and ultimately helped create
“blind spots” that prevented them from seeing the danger
the foam strike posed. (Columbia Accident Investigation
Board 2003, p. 170)

At the Culmination Stage of interpretation, the event
has happened, implementation of response to the event is
under way, and people are amending their earlier explanations based on reactions to the event. Because middle
managers lead implementation efforts, at this stage it is
helpful if the amended explanations of what has happened begin to converge rather than diverge. Divergence
early on is important because it generates many possible
ways to think about what may occur. Once people experience the rare event and attempt to act, convergence is
necessary so that actions can be coherent. People need
help understanding why procedures are changing, and
middle managers can lead the readjustments and changes
by blending the disparate explanations that may still be
circulating (Floyd and Lane 2000). Blending involves
integrating the various existing views and is not the same
as forcing a single interpretation on others.
During this Culmination Stage, it is likely that managers’ frames will affect how they amend their interpretation of an event once it has unfolded. Thus, when
considering rare events, effective interpretations require
managers to incorporate alternate referent points, multiple perspectives, and mechanisms to reconcile differences across the organization in order for action to occur.
At this stage, middle managers face the task of blending
the amended explanations from those above, beneath,
and across the organization. This merging of views supports the development of a consistent perspective, where
everyone acts from the same page as response options
are considered. Thus, we propose:
Proposition 3. Organizations experience rare and
unusual events more richly when, at the Culmination
Stage of interpretation, middle managers blend the
amended explanations of what has happened.
Aftermath Stage—Looking Back
In the Aftermath Stage, managers assess responses to the
event after enough time has elapsed to consider the existing reality essentially permanent. During this period,
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individual and organizational interpretations include the
determination of which parties proﬁted, the recognition of positive and/or negative outcomes, and the overall estimated value to the organization (Isabella 1990).
Interpretations at this stage become speciﬁc and concrete
(Barr 1998). Hindsight bias (Fischoff 1975) is likely
to be a cognitive factor affecting interpretations at this
stage. Because people distort their beliefs about what
they actually knew before an event based on what they
learned after the fact (Hogarth 1987), it will be difﬁcult
for people to accurately judge the impact of the event.6
In this ﬁnal stage of interpretation, the “linking role”
(Wooldridge and Floyd 1990) that middle managers play
is critical to how the organization ultimately comes to
understand and internalize the rare and unusual event.
In the midst of turmoil and uncertainty, top managers
often send confusing signals about what behaviors and
understandings they expect (Burgelman 1983, Floyd and
Lane 2000, Kanter 1982). Thus, middle managers are
the recipients of after-the-fact understandings from those
above, beneath, and across the organization, which may
well be competing (Milliken et al. 2005).

more likely occurs when a “quasi-independent group”
bridges the gaps between organizational units and develops a “complete and coherent view of the    event”
(p. 299). At this stage, organizations evaluate the effects
and implications from the rare event just experienced.
Important to this evaluation function is considering the
lessons learned for the organization as a whole. Middle
managers, because they bridge the strategic and operational levels, can capture important lessons learned from
all levels.
We therefore submit that middle managers can perform this important role during the Aftermath Stage by
combining the evaluations received from those above,
beneath, and across the organization; categorizing these
evaluations as important or not, as unusual or normal;
and getting the attention of others in the organization for
their evaluations. In doing so, middle managers “synthesize” (Floyd and Lane 2000) the multiple lessons learned
into a unitary, though rich, account (Maitlis 2005). They
then can communicate this integrated view outward so
others receive access to the collective learning. Thus, we
propose:

Aftermath Stage and Rare Events. As with the preceding stages, the ability to correctly interpret events during the Aftermath Stage requires more effort when these
events are rare and unusual. Managers may reﬂect on
events that initially appeared inconceivable but are now
considered reasonable, given the passage of time and
knowledge of outcomes. Unfortunately, when managers
incorporate this perspective, the opportunities for accurate assessment and effective learning diminish. In his
study of NASA’s history preceding the Columbia disaster, Farjoun (2005) found that NASA and the space shuttle program missed learning opportunities from similar
prior mission failures. He observed that learning lessons
from the 1999 failure of two robotic Mars probes “had
not been fully internalized” (Farjoun 2005, p. 75) across
the organization. The factors that impeded “organizational learning” included incomplete reviews caused by
time, scheduling, and resource pressures and a predominate silo mentality based on space program and ﬁeld
center identities. In addition, NASA ofﬁcials did not
capture useful lessons learned because of their inability to see the future relevance of the Mars probe incidents, in effect ﬁnding no connection between robotic
and manned space programs. NASA further stiﬂed learning chances by “decoupling    the groups that recommend lessons and the groups that implement them” (Farjoun 2005, p. 75), thereby limiting the ﬂow of potentially
useful information.
How, then, do managers learn from rare and unusual
events when they rely on cognitive heuristics, such as
hindsight bias, that convert the relevant to the irrelevant,
the unlikely to the typical, and the implausible to the
ordinary? Woods (2005) suggests that improved learning

Proposition 4. Organizations experience rare and
unusual events more richly when, at the Aftermath Stage
of interpretation, middle managers synthesize the evaluations of what has happened.

Conclusion
Given the complex and rapidly changing nature of most
organizational environments, rare and unusual events are
likely to challenge organizations at an ever-increasing
pace. Making sense of these events, identifying cues,
and giving them meaning is a prerequisite for learning and for action. More than two decades ago, Daft
and Weick (1984) described organizations as interpretation systems, where interpretation is a critical component
of how organizations learn. Since their seminal article,
we have come to understand more about how top managers are likely to interpret events (Barr 1998, Thomas
et al. 1993), yet we still have little knowledge of what
it means for organizations to develop interpretations.
Although most studies acknowledge the “socially constructed” nature of interpretations, little is known about
the multilevel pattern of interactions that take place to
create the organization’s overall interpretation. What is
an organization’s interpretation? Who forms the organization’s interpretation? These questions are important, as
much of the analyses of the Columbia disaster suggest
that faulty interpretation systems played a role in what
happened.
In this paper, we argue that in the case of rare and
unusual events, the interpretation stage of learning takes
on heightened importance because, by deﬁnition, a rare
and unusual event is associated with surprise and being
taken unawares (Cunha et al. 2006). Thus, when they are
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confronted by rare and unusual events, people search for
a way to interpret what has happened, and these interpretations play a key role in determining what can be
learned from the event (Daft and Weick 1984, Lant et al.
1992, March et al. 1991).
Building on the work of earlier interpretation scholars, such as Isabella (1990) and Barr (1998), we offer a
multilevel, multistage model of organizational interpretation that illuminates the complexity created by cognitive
biases and hierarchical context. These elements affect
how meaning is imparted to rare and unusual events. Our
model is also based on the theoretical assumption that
interpretation is a process of creating meaning (Gioia
and Chittipeddi 1991) rather than being a process of
distributing meaning. Our exploration of how organizations interpret rare and unusual events builds on prior
work that highlights the important role that middle managers play in sensemaking in general (Balogun 2003;
Balogun and Johnson 2004, 2005). Here we suggest
that (1) organizations can develop a rich interpretation
at each stage of interpreting a rare and unusual event,
in spite of cognitive biases, and (2) middle managers,
because of their position in the hierarchy, participate in
multiple conversations that can help shape the organization’s interpretation.
A more active role for middle managers in interpretation contributes to learning from rare and unusual events
in four ways. First, as we highlighted previously, March
and colleagues remind us that organizations learn from
small samples when they experience rare and unusual
events richly, and this involves three activities. One, an
organization learns from a rare event when its members experience more and different aspects of the event
as the event occurs. Two, an organization learns more
from a rare event if its members exchange interpretations
about what is happening. Three, organizational learning from a rare event occurs when varying perceptions
of likely outcomes and multiple preferences for outcomes are considered (March et al. 1991). Middle managers can help organizations learn different lessons from
rare events because of their structural proximity to so
many different individuals, who attach unique meaning
to the same experience (March et al. 1991). However,
the responsibility for richly experiencing rare events falls
on top management, which needs to encourage middle
managers to be vigilant sensemakers and sensegivers
(Maitlis 2005).
The second reason that an active role for middle managers in interpretation contributes to learning from rare
and unusual events relates to the fact that the interpretation of ambiguous data is not always a straightforward process. As Milliken and colleagues (2005) noted,
“Well-intentioned people sitting in different places in
an organization can see the same stimulus differently”
(p. 251). We propose that interpretation beneﬁts maximally from the multiple contexts—top, middle, and front
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line—in which multiple managers notice stimuli and
form interpretations. As Huber (1991) suggests, more
and varied interpretations translate to more learning.
Third, considerable evidence suggests that managers’
perceptions are often not accurate (Mezias and Starbuck
2003, Starbuck and Hedberg 2001). We argue that it is
less likely that any one “misperception” will dominate
an organization’s interpretation of a rare and unusual
event when the organization considers and shares multiple interpretations, thereby improving the reliability
of the learning process (March et al. 1991). Because
cognitive biases affect every manager’s interpretation of
events, it is less likely that any one cognitive bias will
dominate the interpretation because, in a sense, the cognitive biases of one group counteract those of another
group. The result is improved organizational understanding, and consequently a more valid learning process
(March et al. 1991).
Fourth, organizations can avoid catastrophic errors
through mindful organizing that resists simpliﬁcation
(Weick and Sutcliffe 2001). When top managers hold
middle managers responsible for both animating and
guiding the interpretation process, a more complex
process of interpretation unfolds and the organization
resembles the mindful organizing that Weick (2005)
calls for:
People who engage in mindful organizing regard simpliﬁcation as a threat to effectiveness. They pay attention to information that disconﬁrms their expectations
and thwarts desires. To do this they make a deliberate
effort to maintain a more complex, nuanced perception
of unfolding events. Labels and categories are continually reworked, received wisdom is treated with skepticism, checks and balances are monitored, and multiple
perspectives are valued. (p. 168)

When organizations use a robust organizational interpretation system in which middle managers assume an
active role, they are more likely to experience rare and
unusual events richly, increasing the chance of learning
from such events. We began this paper by highlighting
some of the most common difﬁculties people have in
noticing and reacting to rare and unusual events. They
have a tendency to ignore warnings that are inconsistent with their own beliefs (Nystrom and Starbuck 1984)
and to normalize that which is not normal (Vaughan
2005). People also have a tendency to downplay the likelihood of ambiguous threats (Edmondson et al. 2005,
Goleman 1985).
The central argument of this paper is that when middle
managers take an active role in the interpretation of rare
and unusual events, chances that the organization will
avoid the mistakes of ignoring warnings, normalizing
that which is not normal, and downplaying ambiguous
threats increase. When middle managers both animate
and guide the process of interpretation, multiple perspectives will be represented and will shape the meaning
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Figure 1

The Role Middle Managers Perform in Organizational Interpretation and Learning from Rare and Unusual Events

Middle manager behaviors across stages of interpretation of rare and unusual events
Anticipation

Confirmation

Behaviors that encourage divergence
• Sensemaking (Maitlis 2005)
• Championing divergent views (Floyd and
Lane 2000)
• Animating (Maitlis 2005)
• Surfacing/exposing conflicting views
• Disseminating/sharing information
(Mintzberg 1978)

Culmination

Aftermath

Behaviors that encourage convergence
•
•
•
•
•
•

Sensegiving (Maitlis 2005)
Linking (Floyd and Wooldridge 1992)
Integrating/blending (Nonaka 1988)
Guiding adaptation (Chakravarthy 1982)
Synthesizing (Floyd and Lane 2000)
Selling (Dutton and Ashford 1993)

Impact on organizational interpretation of rare and unusual events
• Realize a broader set of interpretations
(Huber 1991, March et al. 1991)

• Experience events more richly (March
et al. 1991)

• Incorporate a diversity of viewpoints (Fiol
1994)

• Allow for emergent interpretation
(Milliken et al. 2005, Plowman and
Duchon 2008)

• Reduced likelihood of
o Normalizing unusual events (Vaughan 2005)
o Ignoring warnings inconsistent with beliefs

(Nystrom and Starbuck 1984)
o Downplaying ambiguous threats
(Edmondson et al. 2005)

• Not dominated by any one bias (Bazerman
2006, Hogarth 1987)
• Establish narratives (Abma 2000, Boje
1995, Fincham 2002)

Impact on organizational learning from rare and unusual events
Increases learning (Huber 1991)
Learn different lessons (March et al. 1991)
Increases reliability and validity (March et al. 1991)
Mindful organizing (Weick 2005)

that is given to rare or unusual events. At each stage of
interpretation, it is more likely that the organization can
experience the rare event richly, and thereby increase its
capacity to learn from the event, when middle managers
actively animate and guide interpretations.
Similarly, when organizations encourage an active
sensemaking (animating) and sensegiving (guiding) role
for middle managers, there is no single or dominant
interpreter in all situations. Rather, our model as shown
in Figure 1, recognizes that managers at all levels of the
organization interpret issues and discourages the practice
of dictating a dominant interpretation from the top down.
Instead, in our model we give attention ﬁrst to exposing differences among interpretations, then allowing for
and integrating these multiple interpretations. Through
the activities of blending and synthesizing (Floyd and
Lane 2000), middle managers contribute to a dynamic
process of interpretation in which multiple ﬁlters from
throughout the organization help frame and enrich interpretations of rare and unusual events. The interpretation

becomes more like a mosaic of multiple understandings. The dominant concerns of strategic managers and
front-line managers are woven into this interpretation
mosaic.
Limitations
We rely heavily on the empirical ﬁndings of Isabella
(1990) and Barr (1998), who each observed that interpretation happens in distinct stages and recognized there
is an assumed linearity and rigidity to the model that
is probably not always accurate (Brown and Humphreys
2003). The distinct stages that Isabella observed may be
a function of her focus on the interpretation of large-scale
organizational change. The model we present implies a
linear relationship and a unitary sequential movement
from one stage to another. Consider, for example, the
likely stages of interpreting an unusual event such as
the detection of a foam strike against the wing of a
space shuttle: the event occurred, there was no Anticipation Stage, and an initial interpretation task was to
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decide whether the event was signiﬁcant. Although some
at NASA were sure that a signiﬁcant event had occurred
and were immediately in the Conﬁrmation Stage, comparing this event to other past events and perhaps moving quickly to the Culmination Stage, others failed to
attend to the foam strike until the re-entry disintegration
of Columbia 16 days later. Thus, it is possible that the
organization does not move in a unitary or rigid fashion through the stages, as implied by Isabella, especially
when there is not agreement as to whether there is an
event under consideration. This line of research could
beneﬁt from the empirical examination of interpretation
in other types of events besides organizational change.
We additionally make extensive and exclusive use
of secondary literature regarding the space shuttle
Columbia disaster to provide examples that support our
theory development. We did not develop our theory
based on these examples. Even so, we recognize the limitations of using this speciﬁc rare and unusual event as
a reference point. NASA is a very particular kind of
organization. Thus, the middle management experience
there may not be entirely representative of other middle
management experiences.
We also recognize the potential limits to the generalizability of our model. We have constrained our model to
include three concepts related to learning from rare and
unusual events—the temporal sequence of the related
interpretation process, cognitive biases, and hierarchical
context. However, other concepts have the potential to
inﬂuence our model as well. For example, power differentials between the hierarchical levels in organizations
may hamper the sharing of information and interpretations and thus limit the chance for middle managers
to guide and animate the interpretation process. Such
power struggles were evident in the Columbia disaster.
Managers at NASA often overruled the lower-level engineers who struggled to gain attention for their safety
concerns (Buljan and Shapira 2005). This conﬂict grew,
in part, from the pressures on managers to meet launch
schedules. Similarly, power differences across levels
could potentially modify the cognitive processes of the
organization. Lant and Shapira (2001) suggest that institutional barriers, such as power structures and control
mechanisms, may inhibit how organizations store and
use information. These barriers can result in faulty interpretations and performance assessments. Incorporation
of additional concepts, such as power, could expand the
generalizability of our model by accounting for further
direct and moderating effects on organizational learning
from rare and unusual events. In addition, rare events
are often sudden and require a rapid response that allows
little time for socially constructed processes. Situational
demands may require that organizations act based on
factors other than interpretations. Further research into
options to abbreviate or condense our model’s stages
could prove useful for these acute situations.
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Implications for Research
Although we focused largely on how middle managers
can inﬂuence the vertical exchange of information and
meaning related to rare and unusual events, it is clear
that middle managers also inﬂuence each other (Balogun
2003; Balogun and Johnson 2004, 2005). Middle managers are part of a social network of players who shape
how organizations come to understand and give meaning to cues and signals. It is through their interaction
with others across all levels that interpretations form and
knowledge creation and understanding occur (Nonaka
1994). Consideration of the social dynamics in the formation of interpretations could further our understanding of how organizations interpret and learn from rare
events. In one sense, we have argued here that much of
the organizational literature on interpretation takes a narrow view—strategic managers form interpretations and
dispense them, much as if they were a commodity, to
others. In fact, the process may often be much more
complex, and conceptualizing organizations as social
networks that change constantly (Kilduff et al. 2006)
could provide an even richer way of considering the
complex nature of organizational interpretation.
Because of the topic of this special issue, our paper
focuses on how organizations make sense of rare and
unusual events. However, sensemaking and interpretations are clearly part of the everyday experience of participating in an organization. A useful line of research
would be to examine the differences in everyday sensemaking and sensemaking that occurs in rare and unusual
events. Do organizations that encourage the use of multiple voices for sensemaking in everyday situations perform better in rare and unusual events than those that
are more efﬁcient in everyday sensemaking? Do these
organizations tend to be surprised less often? Many
of the research questions we have suggested are best
addressed through qualitative research methods, such as
the use of narratives (Czarniawska 1998), that will help
researchers continue to build theory related to organizational interpretation.
Finally, there is some evidence that organizations that
devote attention to how they manage meaning outperform
those who only emphasize how they manage information (Sutcliffe and Weber 2003). Thus, an organization’s
“interpretation orientation” has the potential to be a
source of competitive advantage. Organizations can learn
and from learning, can perform better. A strong role for
middle managers in shaping the organization’s interpretation of events and situations may be critical in developing an interpretation orientation that becomes a strategic
advantage, not just in the case of rare and unusual events.
Implications for Practice
In a world of accelerating change, increasing complexity, and ongoing uncertainty, attention to how people
make sense of rare and unusual events becomes more
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important for organizations. The illustrations from the
space shuttle Columbia disaster provide vivid examples
of how easily organizations can drift into routine ways
of noticing events and standardized ways of interpreting
events that can be extremely costly, if not catastrophic.
At least three implications for managers emerge from
the elaboration of our model. First, many managers
avoid conﬂict and even see the presence of conﬂict
as a managerial weakness. However, experiencing rare
and unusual events richly, and thereby learning from
them, requires conﬂicting perceptions and interpretations. Multiple interpretations do not necessarily mean
incoherence; they may be a sign of an organization in
the process of a rich experience.
Second, managers should be encouraged and rewarded
for asking questions that do not conﬁrm biases and for
seeking out disparate views. It is by surfacing divergent
thinking that managers can best see their way forward
in ambiguous situations. This will not happen, though, if
organizations dismiss conﬂict and fault managers for its
presence. Middle managers who raise conﬂicting views
about an impending event or who facilitate the exchange
of explanations about unfolding events may be helping
the organization experience the unfolding event richly.
Finally, our model emphasizes an active role for middle managers in shaping the way organizations interpret
rare and unusual events. This may require changes in
entrenched practices that do not yield easily. Much of
the analysis of the Columbia disaster points to a rigid
organizational culture more inclined to accept the judgments of those high in the organization than those with
expertise, whose interpretations might have made a difference (Starbuck and Farjoun 2005).
Interpretation is one of the key components of organizational learning. If organizations learn from rare and
unusual events, it happens in part because their interpretation processes enable them to experience events richly.
Our theory of organizational interpretation reveals the
complexity of this process by illuminating the temporal,
cognitive, and hierarchical dimensions of interpretation.
At every stage of the interpretation process, cognitive
bias and organizational hierarchy are likely to inﬂuence
the interpretations that are given to rare and unusual
events. Middle managers, however, are in a unique position to help organizations experience unfolding events
richly by encouraging divergence in the early stages of
interpretation and convergence in later stages. In the face
of rare and unusual events and moments of complete
ambiguity, organizations that have developed interpretation systems that broaden rather than limit the number of
interpretations are better equipped to respond effectively
to the future that is unfolding around them.
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Endnotes
1

On February 1, 2003, the space shuttle Columbia broke
apart during re-entry when a hole in the shuttle’s left wing
became compromised. A piece of foam from the external
fuel tank detached, struck Columbia’s left wing during the
shuttle launch, and caused the hole. In an effort to understand the behavioral and organizational factors that led to the
disaster, Starbuck and Farjoun (2005) invited and combined
research contributions from several organization scholars. We
drew heavily from their book and collective insights as the
source for our examples.
2
Hogarth (1987) organized a list of 29 cognitive biases by
stages of information processing in which each bias is most
likely to occur: acquisition, processing, output, and feedback.
During the acquisition stage, biases such as selective perception, concrete information, and data effects are some of the
biases most likely to occur. During the processing stage, biases
such as anchoring and adjusting, representativeness, and others
are likely to occur. In the output stage, biases such as framing, illusion of control, and wishful thinking are likely. Finally,
in the feedback stage, biases such as hindsight bias, conﬁrmation trap, and attribution errors are most likely to occur.
These information-processing stages seemed to us to parallel
Isabella’s (1990) stages of interpretation. Thus, we draw on
Hogarth’s framework in elaborating our model of organizational interpretation and highlight one likely bias at each stage
of the interpretation process.
3
Based on Hogarth’s (1987) information stages, other biases
such as frequency and illusory correlation also affect how people accumulate rumors and bits of information.
4
Other biases that may occur at this stage include representativeness (Bazerman 2006), and anchoring and adjusting.
5
Other biases that could affect managers at this stage in
amending their earlier explanations include illusion of control
(people exaggerate the extent to which they control things,
self-aggrandizing when the outcomes are good and rationalizing when outcomes are bad) and wishful thinking (people’s
preferences for outcomes of events affect their assessment of
the events) (Hogarth 1987).
6
Other biases that are also likely at this stage of the interpretation process include the fallacies in recall (Hogarth 1987),
which is the ﬁnding that the inability to recall details of an
event leads to erroneous reconstruction of events; and attribution error, which is the tendency to attribute the success of an
outcome to one’s skill and the failure of an outcome to chance.
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